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the jurisdiction to determine in the first instance whether or not the
three-judge acts are applicable to any given complaint presented to
him. If he determines that the acts are applicable, he must immediately
set in motion the machinery for convening a court of three judges. If,
on the other hand, he determines that the acts are not applicable, he
may dispose of the action. In the latter case, the proper method of
review is by appeal to the court of appeals where both the determina-
tion as to the applicability of the three-judge acts and the final dis-
position of the case will be subject to review. The court of appeals
will first consider the district judge's determination as to the ap-
plicability of the three-judge acts. If it finds that he erroneously de-
cided that question, that is as far as it need go; for the case must be
reversed and remanded to the district court with directions to pro-
ceed with the convening of the three-judge court. If, however, it af-
firms the district judge's decision as to the applicability of the three-
judge acts,54 it should then proceed to review the district judge's
final disposition of the case.
S. JAMES THOMPSON, JR.
CAPACITY OF ALIEN TEMPORARY VISITOR
TO ACQUIRE DOMICILE
An adult male has the capacity to abandon one domicile and
to acquire a new domicile of choice in another locality if he is actually
present in the new place and if he has the intent to make the new
location his home.1 Courts have held, however, that persons in prison
2
rAFor a case demonstrating this situation see Booker v. Tennessee Bd. of Educ.,
24o F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 695 (1958). There plaintiffs
sought an injunction restraining the enforcement of certain Tennessee statutes on
the ground of their unconstitutionality. Plaintiffs applied for a court of three judges.
The district judge held that the constitutional question was unsubstantial when
viewed in light of prior Supreme Court holdings and therefore refused the appli-
cation for a court of three judges. The judge then disposed of the case on the merits,
denying the relief asked for. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. The court of appeals affirmed the district judge's decision as to
the applicability of the three-judge acts and then proceeded to review his dispo-
sition of the case on the merits. The court concluded that the relief asked for should
have been granted and reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case.
'Sprague v. Sprague, 131 N.J. Eq. 104, 23 A.2d 8io (1942); In re Frick's Estate,
i6 Misc. 488, 19o N.Y. Supp. 262 (Sun-. Ct. 1921); In re Dorrance's Estate, 3o9 Pa.
151, 163 At. 303 (1932); In re Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401, lo3 AtI. 274 (1918);
Minor, Conflict of Laws i1o (igoi).
2Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 45 (2d ed. 1938).
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and in the armed forces3 lack the requisite capacity for formulating
the necessary intention to change their domicile. The reason given is
that one cannot acquire a domicile by an act done under legal or
physical compulsion. 4 Similar problems of capacity to acquire a domi-
cile of choice arise in the case of infants,5 students,0 and married
women.
7
Another interesting capacity problem involves the alien in the
United States on a temporary visitor's visa. In Gosschalk v. Gosschalk,s
the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that such an alien could
acquire a domicile in that state. The New Jersy divorce statute re-
quires one of the parties to be a bona fide resident of the state for
two years preceding the commencement of the action.0 Gosschalk was
a Dutch national who was in the United States on a temporary visi-
tor's visa that had been extended several times. He sued for a divorce
thirteen months after he received a permanent immigration visa.
Since the words "bona fide resident" in the New Jersey statute are
synonymous with "domiciliary,"1 0 the wife contended that the New
Jersey court lacked jurisdiction on the theory that Gosschalk could
not have been a domiciliary of New Jersey for two years.
To qualify for admission as a temporary visitor, an alien must es-
tablish: "(i) that he has a residence in a foreign country which he
3Hammerstein v. Hammerstein, 269 S.V.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). It
seems that where a serviceman lives off base and shows a clear intention to make his
home where he lives, he may acquire a domicile of choice there. See Sasse v. Sasse,
41 Wash. 2d 363, 249 P.2d 38o (1952). For a discussion of state statutes which re-
quire only residence within the state in order for servicemen to sue for divorce
see Comment, 15 Wash. 8. Lee L. Rev. 248 (1958).
'Note, 13 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 697 (1952).
rBeekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923 (1907).
'Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 1o8, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947); Barker v. Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1955).
'There has been a tendency in the United States to hold that a wife may have
a domicile separate from her husband if the requirements of intention and pres-
ence are met. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1913); Berlingieri v. Berlingieri,
372 Ill. 60, 22 N.E.2d 675 (1939); Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W.2d
448 (1940); Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord, i6o Va. 524, 169 S.E. 909 (1933). English
law adheres rigidly to the view that a married woman cannot acquire a domicile
apart from her husband. Note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 134 (1926).
828 N.J. 73, 145 A.2d 327 (1958), affirming 48 NJ. Super. 566, 138 A.2d 774 (App.
Div. 1958). The court also decided that it was under no duty to stay a proceeding
pending before it on account of the pendency in Holland of a similar action pre-
viously instituted by the wife. The court reasoned that comity was a discretionary
matter and that each court is free to proceed in its own way without reference to
proceedings in the other court.
"N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 34-10 (1952).
"Voss v. Voss, 5 N.J. 402, 75 A.2d 889, 891 (1950).
1959]
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has no intention of abandoning... (3) that he intends to remain
in the United States temporarily; (4) that he intends in good faith
and will be able to depart from the United States at the expiration of
a temporary stay."'" The majority in the principal case points out
that the plaintiff could be deemed to have established a legal domicile
while in the United States on a temporary visa. Since plaintiff was
able to obtain periodic extensions of his visa and did remain in
New Jersey, "his intention was believably probable. Certainly, the best
evidence of one's intention is the fact of compliance .... ,112 Judge
Francis in the dissenting opinion argues that Gosschalk did not have
the legal capacity to remain here permanently. "So his intention
with respect to domicile was incapable of fruition. Clothed in its
most favorable legal raiment, it might be said that in effect he
contemplated making his home here if and when he attained immi-
grant status .... In other words, a domicile would come into exist-
ence when he was free to choose it, i.e., upon the happening of the
condition."13 The dissent concedes that when Gosschalk was granted
an immigrant's visa, he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in New Jersey and had a right to establish a domicile. The problem
is whether he could combine eleven months of residence under the
temporary visa with thirteen months of residence under the immi-
grant visa to meet the necessary residence (domicile) requirement. The
majority relied strongly on three New York cases.14 In Taubenfeld v.
Taubenfeld,15 the plaintiff wife, who was unable to secure an immi-
gration visa, was in the United States on a transit visa for the pur-
pose of proceeding to Australia. In an action for divorce she moved
for temporary alimony and counsel fees. Defendant filed a cross-motion
"Besterman, Commentary on the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A.
1, 37 (1952), commenting on 8 U.S.C.A. § lioi(a)(15)(B) (1952).
1-138 A.2d at 779.
is145 A.2d at 329.
"Greiner v. Bank of Adelaide, 176 Misc. 315, 26 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Townsend v. Townsend, 176 Misc. 19, 26 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Taubenfeld
v. Taubenfeld, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2d Dep't 1949). In the Greiner
case the court points out: "The mere fact that Plaintiff arrived under a temporary
visa is not enough to prevent him from becoming a resident of this state." 26
N.Y.S.2d at 516. Plaintiff was, however, a resident of Holland and while in the Unit-
ed States, Holland was invaded by the Germans. In the Townsend case the parties
were compelled to leave France to avoid being placed in a German concentration
camp. In this situation it was impossible to get any visa to the United States other
than a temporary visitor's visa. "In these unusual circumstances our courts will not
interpret the statute so as to prevent plaintiff from maintaining this action." -6
N.Y.S.2d at 518.
1276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2d Dep't 1949).
[Vol. XVI
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to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff, in view of
the transitory nature of her presence in this country, was precluded
from becoming a domiciliary of New York. The lower court held
that plaintiff was not free to exercise an intent to establish a domicile.
"[H]er declaration of intention to become domiciled in the State may
be characterized as the mere expression of a hope to accomplish that
result."' 6 In reversing the lower court, the Appellate Division held
that "plaintiff may maintain this action, even though she is not domi-
ciled in this State, because it affirmatively appears that she was actually
sojourning or dwelling here at the time the offense was committed
and when the action was commenced.... In any event, the mere fact
that plaintiff entered the United States on a transit visa does not es-
tablish as a matter of law that she may not acquire a domicile."' 7
The dissent in Gosschalk points out that in the Taubenfeld case
domicile was not a prerequisite for maintaining the action in New
York, and accordingly, if cited by the majority for the proposition that
domicile is no longer a requisite for a court to exercise jurisdiction
in a divorce action, it would seem to be directly in conflict with the
New Jersey statutory provisions and decisions which require the
element of domicile.' 8 The dissent loses sight of the majority's reason
for citing Taubenfeld. The majority cited Taubenfeld for the sole
proposition "that the mere fact that plaintiff entered the United
States on a transit visa is not of itself a fatal bar to his establishing
the fact that he is domiciled here....,19
Another New York decision in point, although not cited in the
' Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 194 Misc. 505, 87 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
'7Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d Dep't
1949).
s"Jurisdiction in actions for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board,
may be acquired when process is served upon the defendant as prescribed by the
rules of the Supreme Court, and: i. When, at the time the cause of action arose,
either party was a bona fide resident of this state, and has continued so to be down
to the time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for absolute
divorce shall be commenced ... unless one of the parties has been for the 2 years
next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this
state...." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 34-10 (1952). In Voss v. Voss, 5 N.J. 402, 75
A.2d 889, 891 (1950), the Supreme Court of New Jersey points out that "the words
'bona fide resident' as used in the statute are synonymous with domicile and mean
that the parties or either of them must be actually domiciled within the State."
See also Buscema v. Buscema, 2o N.J. Super. 114, 89 A.2d 279 (Ch. 1952), where
the status of a plaintiff, who was obligated to leave the United States as soon as
possible, was said to be incompatible with the "bona fide residence" requirements
of New Jersey.
'Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d Dep't
1949)-
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Gosschalk case, is Jacoubovitch,20 which held that aliens in the
United States on a temporary visa in connection with the employment
of one of them by the United Nations were not necessarily precluded
from establishing a domicile to maintain a divorce action.
Aside from these New York decisions, there is little American
authority on the question of the extent to which a person may con-
tradict the terms of his admission to the United States. The issue was
involved in McGrath v. Kristensen,21 a United States Supreme Court
decision involving naturalization, but the holding is rather equivocal.
22
The outbreak of World War II had prevented the return to Den-
mark of Kristensen, a Danish citizen in the United States on a tem-
porary visitor's visa. Kristensen applied for and received several ex-
tensions of his visa. Under the Selective Training and Service Act,23 a
person such as Kristensen was subject to military service if he was
"residing" in the United States, but as a citizen of a neutral country
he was authorized to apply for exemption from such service. The
making of such an application, however, would constitute a perma-
nent bar to obtaining American citizenship. Kristensen applied for this
exemption from military service. During his involuntary stay in
America, Kristensen was forced by economic necessity to obtain a
job, which violated the terms of his visitor's status. As a result of this
violation, a warrant for his deportation was issued, but its execution
was suspended to determine his eligibility for naturalization. 24 The
United States Supreme Court held that this alien in the United States
on a temporary visitor's visa could not be a "resident" of the country
within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act, and
his application for exemption from military service was ineffective to
bar him from American citizenship. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for
the Court, said, "[W]e cannot conclude, without regulations so de-
fining residence, that a sojourn within our borders made necessary by
'279 App. Div. 1027, 112 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1952).
134o U.S. 162 (195o), affirming 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
2'The Supreme Court quoted Judge Learned Hand, who points out in Neuberger
v. United States, 13 F.2d 541, 542 (2d Cir. 1926): "We shall not try to define what is
the necessary attitude of mind to create or retain a residence under this statute,
and how it differs from the choice of a 'home,' which is the test of domicile. Frankly
it is doubtful whether courts have as yet come to any agreement on the question."
340 U.S. at 175.
mSelective Training and Service Act § 3(a), 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (amended by 55
Stat. 845 (1941)).
4" '(c) In case of any alien ... who is deportable under any law of the United
States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the
Attorney General may ... (2) suspend deportation of such alien if he is not in-
eligible for naturalization ....'" 34o U.S. at 163 n.1.
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the conditions of the times was a residence within the meaning of the
statute."25
The tentative draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second,
in commenting on the Kristensen case, says: "Here the question is
whether the illegality of his entrance or continued residence in the
asylum should bear upon his ability to acquire there a domicile of
choice. This question is as yet unanswered." 26 An alien on a tempor-
ary visitor's visa may acquire a domicile of choice in England.2 7 The
English courts have shown that the animus manendi is a condition
separate and apart from the terms of admission of the dweller; how-
ever, as in the United States, the terms of admission are always some
evidence of intention.
28
A somewhat comparable situation arises in the case of refugees.
29
Courts may allow these persons to acquire a domicile in contradiction
to the terms of admission. The majority in the principal case also
denied conclusive effect to the terms of admission. Even though the
terms of admission are some evidence of intention, the animus manendi
of domicile is a condition separate and apart from the admission
status of the plaintiff. It would seem to follow that in New Jersey
"domicile may... be regarded simply as a legal conclusion fixing
for the forum the law of that jurisdiction which is considered appro-
priate to determine the rights and liabilities of the person in ques-
tion; or as a finding that the relationship between the person and a
state is sufficiently close for the purpose at hand to justify courts of
that state in exercising judicial jurisdiction. The traditional 'rules' of
domicile, under this view, are seen to function not as mechanical rules
of thumb but as selectors and evaluators of those factors which the
courts have hitherto deemed of importance in the ascertainment of
the law to be applied to the case. Patently, under this theory the
m34o U.S. at 176.
n'Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, Reporter's Note § 21, at 83 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954).
'Cruh v. Cruh, [1945] 2 All E.R. 545 (P.); May v. May & Lehman, [1943] 2 All
E.R. 146 (P.).
nlbid.
21 Beale, Conflict of Laws 154 (1935). "Domicile, of course, cannot be changed
by a forced exile, or by a change made necessary in order to secure safety in time
of War .... But where one leaves his country because of his dislike for a political
condition, hoping to return when he can do so as a free citizen, but without im-
mediate expectation of such an event, these facts are compatible with the acquisi-
tion of a domicile in the country to which he goes. [citing Ennis v. Smith, '4 How.
400 (U.S. 1852)]." See Note, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 640 (1942), for a detailed account of
the domicile of refugees.
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